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Abstract 
 The consciousness of animals is a topic that has captivated the interest of philosophers, 
neuroscientists, and psychologists since the days of Aristotle. More evidence that the once 
impermeable separation between animal and human is not as strong of a barrier as once 
believed. The study of consciousness, however, is difficult because it is impossible to study the 
subjective experience of another man, let alone another species. Some scholars believe that 
consciousness is uniquely human.  However, studies that demonstrate cognitive capabilities of 
animals have researchers demonstrating different aspects of behavior that could be indicative 
of a conscious experience. Some attribute consciousness to brain size, or the ability for 
language.  Others support a hybrid of these ideas, among many others. However, no evidence 
currently exists to support any hypotheses of animal consciousness. This paper provides a brief 
history of the study of consciousness and the changing perspectives of where animals stand in 
the conversation. Different studies and beliefs that exist are addressed as well as the relevance 
of animal consciousness.  
Introduction 
 Consciousness is a difficult, often controversial, topic of study. For one, there is no 
widely accepted definition of consciousness. There is also no way to measure consciousness, let 
alone directly observe it in another organism. It is not possible to measure the subjective 
experience of anther being. The goal of science is to observe objective facts that explain 
phenomenon. In general, both neuroscientists and philosophers agree that to understand the 
consciousness of another being, you must know “what it is like to be” that being, which is not 
possible (Nagle, 1974). However, as technology becomes more advanced and more is learned 
through psychology, neuroscience, and ethology, scientists are gaining a better idea of the 
behavior and experience of other species and drawing more similarities to the human conscious 
experience. Addressed in this paper is a brief history of the growing curiosity in the subject of 
consciousness.  Also, the controversy and difficulty of the definition of consciousness, and some 
of the criteria that were once associated with what make exclusively humans conscious are 
considered.  Finally, recent studies of animal consciousness are discussed, as scientists attempt 
to measure and define it (Allen, Trestman, 2017).  
The History of Studying Consciousness  
The subject of consciousness has been explored since the beginning of philosophy. 
Records show the idea of consciousness puzzled philosophical thinkers as early as in the 6th 
century BC. The first real systematic approach to studying consciousness began with French 
philosopher René Descartes (Blackmore, 2016). Descartes established Cartesian dualism, which 
classifies things in the world as either physical (the body, matter) or mental (the mind, soul, and 
consciousness). The soul (mind, consciousness) could exist without the body and the body 
alone could not think. However, normally the soul inhabited the body (in epiphysis) and 
interacted with the world through the body. The problem with dualism is that there is no 
solution to how the mind interacts with the body. For the mind and body to be connected, 
there must be a way that physical experiences are converted into thoughts, and decisions. 
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Descartes even proposed a location for where in the brain this happens, however, even with a 
defined location, a defined mechanism, be it cellular impulses or energy transfers, become 
physical, instead of the mental. Blackmore noted that when one attempts to breakdown 
dualism into its most basic components, there comes a point where one reaches an element of 
“magic” or something that science cannot approach methodically (Blackmore, 2016).  
 Later in the eighteenth century began the early studies of psychology, defined during 
this time as studies of the philosophy of mental life. With this began an objective approach to a 
study of the mind based on the monistic perspective. William James defined psychology as the 
study of the mental life, its phenomena, and its conditions. This included the components of 
consciousness: feelings, impulses, and perceptions. James understood that all these 
components of consciousness were affected by physiological effects, and was included at the 
center of studies pertaining to memory, sensation, and the nervous system. James’s psychology 
centered on consciousness. James began what is now termed psychophysics, or the study of 
physical stimuli and internal, reportable sensation (Blackmore, 2016). Psychophysics was a key 
turning point in the study of consciousness because it was the beginning of a scientific 
approach to looking at consciousness. It was the beginning of finding a way to quantify or 
measure consciousness, even if indirectly (Blackmore, 2016). 
 The problem with psychophysics is that although it began applying scientific standard 
and quantification to the subject of consciousness, it completely ignored how consciousness is a 
subjective experience. This wasn’t addressed until the late 1800s with the emergency of 
phenomenology, the philosophy and psychology based on the subjective experience and 
introspection. Wilhelm Wundt was trained in physiology, creating experiments that studied a 
living system from the outside and drew conclusions based on what was happening inside. He 
wanted, however, to create a psychology and related experiments based on introspection and 
inner experiences.  He believed there were two types of 
elements. The first were physical, objective experiences such as 
sounds and light, and the second were more subjective 
experiences such as feelings. Each conscious experience 
depended on a combination of the two elements.  He created 
systematic, detailed studies and trained fellow researchers how 
to reliably observe their own inner experience. Wundt’s goal was 
to determine the units or atoms that made up the conscious 
experience, but when people are reporting their own 
experiences, and there existed so many differences between 
individuals, it is hard to find uniformity or definition in 
consciousness, and it was not possible to decide who is “right” 
when there was so much variation (Blackmore, 2016).  
Meanwhile, in 1858, Charles Darwin published The Origin 
of Species. This brought new perspective to biology, and 
increased the curiosity of scientists in the world of animals. 
Darwin’s work was significant; it showed that the more research 
Figure 1Darwin’s first phylogenetic 
tree. Courtesy of The Darwin Project. 
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done on animals, the more that could be known about humans, rather than just humans. In 
1872, Darwin published The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. This book 
considered the origins of human characteristics such as blushing or lifting the eyebrows in 
confusion. It explored the biological aspects of emotion. For the first time, the idea of 
subjective experiences was inferred in animals when in the book Darwin suggested human 
emotion is derived from our animal precursors (Lambert).  
  In the 1900’s came behaviorism and the studies of scientists John B. Watson, B. F. 
Skinner, and Ivan Pavlov. Behaviorism essentially took the study of consciousness out of 
psychology. Watson believed that psychology was completely objective, and stated that 
psychology needed introspection “…as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics.”.  
Pavlov and Skinner studied classical conditioning and reflexes, and believed that everything, 
including language, was learned this way and that all of human behavior was shaped off of 
reinforcements with rewards and punishment. Behaviorism brought a standstill to the 
conversation and study of consciousness (Blackmore, 2016).  
The Hard Problem of Consciousness 
 The hard problem of consciousness refers to the difficulty in explaining why and how 
sentient beings have qualia (Harnard, 2000). Qualia are the subjective component of the study 
of consciousness. Qualia are the personal experience and interpretation of smells, and sight, 
the details of conscious experience which cannot be scientifically measured (Tye, 2018). The 
goal of science is to provide an explanation for natural phenomena through objective studies. 
How can consciousness be quantified if there is no way for one to observe and measure the 
qualia of another individual, let alone another species?  This question was first posed in 1974 by 
philosopher Thomas Nagel when addressing the disconnect between subjectivity and 
objectivity in studying consciousness. He used it to illustrate the “hard problem” by saying 
through science, just about everything is known about the bat: its unique physiology of how the 
bat hears and sense prey through echolocation, the physics behind how it flies, how and where 
it lives, its evolutionary history (Dennett, 2018). All of this is known to the scientific community 
through objective studies. Nagel says that the consciousness of the bat, defined as, what it feels 
like to be the bat, to experience objects based on reflected sound rather than on photons, to 
hang upside down and hunt for prey, cannot be in principle known (Blackmore, 2016). Nagel 
concluded that even if there were some magical way to be transformed into a bat, you would 
still not have the true subjectivity of a bat as you would carry your human memories, 
experiences and interests, just in the form of a bat. In other words, there is no way for a human 
to experience or measure? the qualia of another human or animal (Nagel, 1974).  
Today there is still no generally accepted definition of consciousness (Blackmore, 2016; 
Vitti, 2010). Most scientists accept that it exists in humans, and like Wundt seek to understand 
it objectively in terms of science. But without defining the subject of study and devising 
methods for its detection, determining consciousness to different species is solely based off 
intuition and subjectivity. Humans show strong bonds with domestic animals such as cats and 
dogs. These animals exhibit intelligence by solving difficult puzzles in research experiments. 
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They react to pain and exhibit behavior suggestive of a feeling of melancholy. Most people 
would say that these animals are in fact, conscious. This assumption, however, is based on 
human qualia that have been projected onto animals.  
 With no definition of human consciousness and without objective methods for its 
detection, its hard to study consciousness in animals. In humans, individuals assume that other 
humans experience consciousness in the same way that they ae experiencing it, and because 
other humans say they are conscious. So, in spite of not knowing what exactly we are talking 
about, we believe that all humans possess consciousness. But what about animals who seem to 
be different and who can’t communicate to us to what they are feeling? An attempt to resolve 
this difficult question was made in 2012 when a group of scientists simply declared that many 
animals are conscious (declaration reference).  
The Cambridge Declaration  
The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness came about at the Francis Crick Memorial 
Conference in Cambridge, UK on July 7, 2012. It was composed by Philip Low, David Edelman 
and Christof Koch, while edited and reviewed by eleven scientists at the conference. According 
to the Conference’s website, the Declaration “…aims to provide a purely data-driven 
perspective on the neural correlates of consciousness. The most advanced quantitative 
techniques for measuring and monitoring consciousness will be presented, with the topics of 
focus ranging from exploring the properties of neurons deep in the brainstem, to assessing 
global cerebral function in comatose patients…” The document itself is two pages, listing four 
bullet points and a conclusion. The authors declared: “Convergent evidence indicates that non-
human animals  have  the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates  
of conscious states  along  with the  capacity  to  exhibit  intentional behaviors. Consequently, 
the  weight  of  evidence indicates  that humans are  not  unique  in possessing the  neurological  
substrates  that  generate  consciousness.  Non-human animals, including all mammals and 
birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological 
substrates.” In general, authors asserted, based on similarity of involved brain substrates, that 
all mammals, birds and other animals possess substrates for generation of consciousness. This 
implies that all of these animals possess the consciousness.  
The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness is rather unconventional.  For one, 
although alluding to many studies, the Cambridge Declaration only recognizes that studies are 
being done and the information is becoming more available, with nothing specifically cited, 
“Consequently, more data is becoming readily available, and this calls for a periodic 
reevaluation of previously held preconceptions in this field. Studies of non-human animals have 
shown that homologous brain circuits correlated with conscious experience and perception can 
be selectively facilitated and disrupted to assess whether they are in fact necessary for those 
experiences.” This is an extremely broad statement, especially so for the world of scientific 
writing, with no citation to support it. “Previous preconceptions” in the field are noted, 
suggesting there were clear cut notions regarding the consciousness of animals before this 
declaration. The document is vague and could be stronger with specific citations, although it is 
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understandable how additional details could make for an even more controversial or 
ambiguous statement. 
Another detail of the Cambridge Declaration somewhat unsettling is the authors, 
although notable in their own right, did not include scientists from a number of fields. In his 
critique of the declaration, Bekoff (2018)noted that of the fifteen people present, only one had 
done research on animals in the wild. Perspective from scientists who work with wild animals- 
from marine life to insects- would have provided a more holistic viewpoint to the declaration. 
However, the impact this would have affected the declaration itself wouldn’t be substantial. In 
saying that, the declaration was not clear regarding which animal groups exactly are endowed 
with consciousness. In the second bullet point, the declaration states, “sleep and decision 
making appear to have arisen in evolution as early as the invertebrate radiation, being evident 
in insects and cephalopod mollusks (e.g., octopus)” which would have a reader assuming 
insects are included in the consciousness discussion. However, in the summarizing declaration, 
it is stated: “…the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the 
neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non- human animals, including all 
mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these 
neurological substrates.”, which could indicate that insects are not included, and if mollusks 
such as the octopus are included, why not fish (Lowe et al, 2012)? This lack of specificity seems 
to stem from the lack of specific criteria for a minimum sets of substrates that authors thought 
could generate the consciousness. 
Another area of ambiguity in this document is the reference to different traits that 
conscious animals share with no clear definition. A good example of this is in the final bullet of 
the document which states, “…Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have 
the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states 
along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors.” Nowhere in the document are 
definitions or criteria for neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates 
of consciousness, and in my opinion this statement is wildly open to interpretation. Although 
each loosely alluded to, as in the refutation of conscious being requiring a mammalian 
neocortex or in the final bullet point when pharmacological comparisons between humans and 
animals (although unclear which species are being referred to) are made, no definitions or 
criteria are given.  
It should be pointed out that the Declaration is not a scientific document providing 
either original data or an objective overview of existing literature. Rather, it is a statement of a 
belief. It does not provide any testable hypothesis. The document, and its purpose, was blown 
out of proportion and was not meant to be a definition as it has been portrayed to be. The 
signees of the Declaration recognized a need for the definition of consciousness- scientific 
conclusions are hard to draw when analyzing the subjectivity of another being. They recognize 
that similarities exist between humans and animals, and address current research that 
demonstrate the similarities.  In his critique of the Declaration, Torley (2013) stated that even 
the signees of the document disagreed on their personal views of criteria for consciousness and 
which animals were conscious. Presumably, some of the signees have even told him that they 
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have views in opposition to statements made in the Declaration (Torley, 2013). Overall, the 
Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness did not accomplish much, it was merely blown out of 
proportion.  
So, Are Animals Conscious? 
 Cambridge Declaration aside, scientists have tried to conduct studies based on scientific 
method to elucidate the question of animal consciousness. Some of these studies are 
addressed in this section. Even if no universally accepted definition or criteria exist, criteria for 
consciousness have been proposed. Certain scholars argue that only “higher organisms” are 
conscious, referring to humans and those evolutionarily in close relationship to humans. Searle, 
in his book, The Mystery of Consciousness discussed how it is “obvious” that humans and higher 
animals are conscious (Searle, 1997).  An area of gray that arises with this concept is that in 
terms of evolution, the phylogenetic tree isn’t a straight line or a continuum. It has many 
branches and sub-branches that would make it difficult to determine a hard “order” of 
consciousness. Likewise, on what basis do we draw the line between conscious and 
unconscious animals? In a review of current publications, Griffin and Speck (2004) agreed with 
Searle that animals are conscious, and that the content of their consciousness most likely varies 
along a continuum. This continuum ranges from simple feelings to thinking about the 
challenges they face and alternative actions the animal might choose.  Unlike others in the field, 
they choose to not include metacognition (which is thinking about one’s thoughts or the 
thoughts of others) in their criteria of consciousness.  Animals are often responsive to objects 
and events, including social relationships, memories, and simple short-term anticipation of 
events likely to happen in the near future, and they make choices of actions they believe are 
likely to get what they want or avoid what they dislike or fear. Some scholars refute 
consciousness of animals saying that these types of reactions—that is getting a positive 
reinforcement and avoiding a negative one—are purely reflexes and conditioning. However, 
Griffin and Speck go on to explain that when unexpected challenges arise, considering 
alternative actions and choosing the one believed to be most helpful in solving the problem at 
hand is often more effective than reliance on learned responses. That is, consciousness 
provides animals with an evolutionary advantage (Griffin, Speck, 2004).  Below we will discuss 
studies that not only attempt to evaluate the conscious state of animals, but also distinguish 
learned behaviors from conscious decisions.  
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Brain Size  
 
Some scholars proposed that consciousness evolved along a continuum, and that brains 
larger in size are more conscious as opposed to species with smaller brains. Specifically, both 
Greenfield (2000) and Roth and Dicke in their book, The Long Evolution of Brains and Minds 
(2005).proposed that the consciousness increases with brain size. Commenting on this 
hypothesis, Blackmore suggested that if 
this theory is true, sperm whales, African 
elephants, and dolphins are all more 
conscious than humans are. Similarly, a 
Great Dane and a Labrador are more 
conscious than a Jack Russel dog breed 
(Blackmore, 2016). It seems that this 
theory of consciousness is too narrow 
and that here is more to consciousness 
than the size of the brain. 
 
 
Cognitive Ethology 
 
Another attempt to provide an explanation of the consciousness of animals is the study 
of Cognitive Ethology. Cognitive Ethologists would be in agreeance with Speck and Griffin that 
consciousness is an evolved concept, surviving natural selection. Started by Dr. Donald R Griffin, 
Cognitive Ethology is the study of the mental experiences of animals as they behave in their 
natural environment in the course of their normal lives. It involves the “hard”, subjective, 
experiences of animals combined with the neuroscience, which Dr. Carolyn Ristau refers to as 
the “easy” problems which can (and hopefully someday will) be defined by neuronal 
mechanisms.  Both the Dr. Griffin and Dr. Ristau agree that evidence of consciousness include 
possible neural correlates of consciousness, versatility in meeting novel challenges, and animal 
communication which Griffin postulates as a potential ‘window’ into the mental 
experiences. Studies in this field involve deciphering the capabilities of animals in their 
environment such as foraging and storage of food and parenting techniques, and seeing the 
extent that these techniques are learned and how they are taught among a population within a 
species. Ristau makes a point that this must be heeded with caution, as cognitive ethological 
studies can be interpreted to fit either story. For example, one could argue that the beaver 
utilizes higher cognitive skills in repairing broken parts of a dam. Not only does it require skills 
and use of tools, beavers have the capability to learn technique from one another.  Also, an 
element of preparing for future events was involved as weaker portions of a dam were 
reported to be repaired in anticipation of their breaking. These are all points supported by 
studies that a cognitive ethologist might use to support their theory of animal consciousness.  
However, in a different study, the beavers' cognitive abilities in constructing and repairing their 
dams have been criticized. In this study, it was found that when presented with a loudspeaker 
that was playing white noise, a sound similar to water rushing through a hole in a dam, beavers 
plastered mud over the speaker (Wilson, 1971). An adversary of animals having consciousness 
Figure 2 A human brain, left, compared to a dolphin brain, right. According 
to Roth and Greenfield, the larger dolphin brain would indicate dolphins 
are more conscious than humans. Photo Courtesy of underwater360.com 
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could say that the dam building, including the seemingly predictive nature of maintaining the 
dam, were merely learned reflexes in response to sound.  In general, in Griffin’s cognitive 
ethology, each species is given a probability of 0.5 of being conscious. Based on information 
gained from studies, the probability changes, but as demonstrated, interpretation of data from 
cognitive ethology studies can be a difficult task.  
 
Consciousness and Communication 
 
 Briefly touched on previously in 
this section is the concept of animal 
communication. When assigning 
characteristics that contribute to why 
humans are conscious, many scholars 
point to our capability of linguistic 
communication (Haladjilan, 2016). Unlike 
other species, humans learn complicated 
linguistic rules without voluntary effort 
during the early years of development. As vocabulary expands with age, humans are able to 
determine sentence structure, word 
selection, and how sentences and words 
can be used for social and practical 
purposes. Psychology defines language as, 
“a communication system that involves using words and systematic rules to organize those 
words to transmit information from one individual to another.” If the key component to this 
definition lies with the action of “transmitting information”, perhaps broader definitions of 
language are needed when discussed in terms of assigning consciousness. Many species, 
perhaps not linguistically in the way humans communicate, have evolved mechanisms for 
communication that allow transmission of information from one member of the species to 
another. Some examples include honey bees performing different dances to indicate to another 
that a water source is near (Barron and Plath, 2016), peacocks displaying their tail feathers as 
well as emitting sounds to potential mates at a frequency undetected by humans (Freeman and 
Hare, 2015), and even more impressive, killer whales have demonstrated that when socialized 
with bottlenose dolphins, the communication between the whales became very similar to the 
way dolphins communicate with one another (Musser et al, 2014).  Some people argue that 
these mechanisms of communication are instinctive, however, in the case of the dolphin and 
whale, the whales have demonstrated the ability to learn from the dolphins. Although not vocal 
communication like humans, if the components of consciousness are going to include language, 
it must be considered that some forms of non-vocal language is just as effective and indicative 
of cognition levels similar to humans. Perhaps, in the way humans have not needed to evolve a 
dance to indicate a food source like the honey bee, no other species have faced a need to 
evolve vocal language.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 A peacock displays his feathers to a peahen. The feathers 
vibrate at a frequency undetectable to humans as a form of 
communication. Courtesy of Andrew Murray and BBC. 
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Theory of The Mind 
 
 Another quality associated with human consciousness is the theory of the mind. Theory 
of the mind refers to an individual’s understanding of another individual’s knowledge, beliefs, 
emotions, and intentions and using that understanding to navigate social situations (Thompson, 
2017).  Its considered a theory because, like many proposed components of consciousness, it 
has to do with unobservable, subjective experiences of others.  In a 1978 study, chimpanzees 
were confronted with photos and videos of humans facing problems.  For example, one showed 
a video of an actor locked in a cage. The chimpanzees were able to select the correct solution to 
each of these problems, representing that they understood the actor’s problem and purpose 
(Premack, Woodruff, 1978). These studies illustrated that they were able to consider the 
perspective of another and anticipate future plans. There are not many other species scientists 
have been able to study theory of the mind with, due to its extremely subjective nature.  One 
however is the domestic dog. In this experiment, the human in the room (the dogs met shortly 
before the experiment started) portrayed some sort of body language either encouraging or 
discouraging the dog from pursuing a food sample in the room. Examples of experimental 
designs would be the human distracted with a handheld game, or staring at the food source, or 
with their back completely turned.  The experimenter did not react contingently to the dog's 
behavior either during the trial or after the trial was concluded to avoid dogs learning to take 
the food regardless of whether this was forbidden. The results of the study indicated that dogs 
were in fact sensitive to the state of the human in the room in regards to approaching the food 
source. The dogs were particularly aware of whether the experimenter’s eyes were open versus 
closed, indicating that the dogs perceived the eyes as an important component in determining 
the attentional states of humans. The authors of the study are keen to comment in the 
discussion that they realize it could be argued that the dogs could be using other cues besides 
eye contact from the humans, but this was carefully controlled in the experimental design (Call 
et al, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4  In Call et al's study, The experimenter placed food on the ground and forbade the 
dog to take it (photo A) and then sat on a chair with their back turned to the dog (B), and the 
dog took the food (C). 
12 
 
 
 
 
Self Recognition 
 
 The final component of consciousness addressed in this paper is self-recognition, or the 
ability to be the object of your own attention. Until recently, self-recognition was thought to be 
characteristic to only humans and non-human primates (Gallup, 1977). The great apes, 
dolphins, elephants and magpies have recently been included as self-recognizing subjects 
(Morrison, 2018).  In this study, used for almost fifty years now, animals are made familiar with 
mirror for three days. After three days, a sticker or mark is placed somewhere on the animal to 
where they cannot see it without using the mirror. Humans begin to demonstrate self-
recognition at three years of age, chimpanzees at four, 
and dolphins at an impressive seven months (Preston, 
2018; Morrison, 2018). For example, the primates had a 
sticker placed on their face.  The object is to observe if 
the animal looks in the mirror and notices the 
abnormality on their self, which is an indication of 
awareness of self.  As with other cognitive ethology 
studies, it can be difficult to objectively analyze the 
results. The chimpanzee was fairly easy to draw the self-
reflection conclusion, as when looking in the mirror, after 
some time they stopped making threatening sounds at the 
mirror, as they would at another animal. They picked food 
out of their teeth and picked their nose, and immediately 
investigated red paint on their ear or eyebrow. This isn’t as straight forward in other species. 
For example, aquarium dolphins studied their eyes and mouths, did flips and blew different 
kinds of bubbles. When marked with black marker, they spent more time looking at the side 
with the black marker (Reiss, Marino, 2001). While this may very well be conclusive to the 
dolphin reacting to the knowledge that the mirror is reflecting their self, it arguably could also 
have similar reactions to seeing another dolphin and curiosity. The creator of the test, Dr. 
Gallup, has critiqued experiments that conclude more than humans, chimps, and orangutans as 
being self-aware. He concluded that a lot of the studies granting self awareness to other species 
didn’t produce consistent results (Anderson, Gallup, 2015). It’s difficult to interpret animal 
behavior, and in self recognition studies, as Gallup points out, it can be easy to make the 
mistake of interpreting any behavior as results. To study self recognition in animals that are not 
considered visually oriented, Horowitz designed a species relevant test that required dogs 
identify their own scent versus the scent of another canine. Dogs were presented with canisters 
of their own urine, the urine of another dog, and a mixture of the two. It was concluded that 
dogs spend less time investigating their own urine, an indication that they are aware it is their 
own scent (Horowitz, 2017).  
 
 In summary, even with no definition of consciousness, there are certain attributes that 
are often considered to be an important part of human consciousness. These include, as 
Figure 5 One of Dr. Reiss’ 
dolphins encountering the 
mirror used in the study (Reiss, 
Marino 2001).. 
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aforementioned, short-term anticipation of events likely to happen in the near future, 
considering alternate actions when unexpected events occur, language, theory of the mind, and 
the ability to recognize one’s self. It is being assumed that if one could show these attributes in 
animals, then one could deduce that they possess the consciousness. In the case of animals, 
research has shown that the definitions of criteria for these features are either just recently 
being explored or the definition is too narrow.  As we are just beginning to scratch the surface 
on the cognitive abilities of animals, much of what makes humans conscious exists in animals, 
but may manifest differently, like in the case of linguistic ability.   
  
Conclusion 
 Humans have always been curious in the relationship we share with our animal 
ancestors. Exploring the reasons animals are conscious could provide important insights into 
our own consciousness. Likewise, the more information learned about consciousness in animals 
could provide medical breakthroughs for humans who experience injuries that leave them 
unconscious (Boly et al, 2013). Adversaries of granting consciousness to animals may hold the 
opinion that we can’t acknowledge animals as conscious, because this question is in principle 
unknowable. Also, drawing from animal analogies of human cognitive abilities could be 
deceiving as suggested by recent developments in artificial intelligence. For example, most 
would agree that self-driving cars are by design not conscious. Yet, a self-driving car is able to 
react based on traffic. Is this any different than a dog reacting differently based on a human’s 
eye contact? It seems that questions like this will continue to puzzle future generations of 
neuroscientists.  
Human beings have been curious about our own consciousness and the consciousness 
of our animal counterparts for as long as philosophy has been around. As cognitive psychology 
and cognitive ethology continue to advance, the gap separating humans and animals, as far as 
perceived consciousness, will close. Qualities that scholars assumed were required for 
consciousness, that once seemed exclusive to humans, are being demonstrated by animals. 
That being said however, it is pertinent to continue to be conservative in the interpretation of 
results of studies with animals in terms of their subjective experience, as there truly is no way 
to absolutely know what it is like to be another species. Alluded to in the Cambridge 
Declaration, some scientists pose that there are neuronal correlates that are associated to 
being conscious, and that is being researched in humans. If neural correlates are found, 
perhaps they exist in animals. However, in the absence of an unequivocal evidence, I do believe 
that consciousness has evolved from our animal ancestors and we can at least infer what their 
subjective experience is.  
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